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1 INTRODUCTION
At around two o’clock in the morning on 27 March 2005, Phiri resident 
Vusimuzi Paki awoke to the shouts of a tenant who was trying to put out 
a fire in one of the other backyard shacks on Paki’s property. Assisted by 
neighbours, the first crucial minutes were spent trying to extinguish the fire 
using the pre-paid water meter supply that the Johannesburg Water company 
had recently installed to control the residents’ water supply. However, the 
water pressure was insufficient to make much impact on the fire and, after 
a while, the pre-paid meter water supply automatically disconnected due to 
insufficient water credit. Residents were then forced to scoop up ditch water 
with buckets in a desperate attempt to put out the fire. More minutes passed. 
One neighbour tried to telephone the police at Moroka police station but 
no-one answered the phone. After battling for an hour, residents finally put 
out the fire, but not before the shack had burnt to the ground. It was only after 
Paki’s tenant returned home from her night shift that everyone discovered to 
their horror that her two small children had been sleeping in the shack. They 
both died in the fire.
Paki’s story highlights the life and death importance of pre-paid water 
meters. Beyond this tragic incident are other durable water problems: the 
daily indignity and inhumanity that people in Phiri (one of the poorest areas 
of Soweto) have had to endure since Johannesburg Water installed pre-paid 
meters as a cost-recovery measure, starting in 2004, and the prohibitively 
expensive price charged for subsequent water consumption. As Paki’s neigh-
bour Jennifer Makoatsane can attest, Johannesburg Water’s cost-recovery 
has come at the expense of Phiri residents’ basic needs and their constitu-
tionally-guaranteed human rights. Like most Phiri residents, Makoatsane is 
unemployed and desperately poor. She lives on a property with nine other 
people, some in her main house and others in backyard shacks. Because the 
City’s “Free Basic Water” (FBW) supply is allocated per stand and only to 
property-owning account-holders, Makoatsane must share the one allocation 
with all nine people. With so many people sharing the water, the monthly 
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6000 litre – 6 kilolitres (6kl), roughly the volume of one minibus taxi – free 
allocation never lasts to the end of the month, even though household 
members now flush the toilet only once a day and bathe only every second 
day. Since the advent of the pre-paid meters, once the FBW allocation is 
exhausted (usually around the 12th day of the month), the pre-paid water 
meter automatically disconnects the water supply until further water credit is 
purchased. However, in households like Makoatsane’s, where there is rarely 
enough money to purchase sufficient water to ensure an adequate supply for 
the month, the automatic disconnection typically signals no water supply at 
all until the next month’s FBW allocation is loaded and dispensed.
The automatic disconnection feature of pre-paid meters is unusual and it 
does not occur in conventional meters (found elsewhere in Johannesburg), 
which provide important procedural protections prior to any disconnection 
of the water supply. These protections – the purchase of water on credit with 
reasonable notice of being in arrears and of possible disconnection, along with 
an opportunity to make representations before there is a disconnection – are 
in place in conventional water supplies precisely to avoid the Phiri situation, 
where people are forced to go without water for days at a time because of cir-
cumstances beyond their control, including abject vulnerability and poverty. 
Yet, while people in Johannesburg’s richer suburbs with conventional meters 
continue to enjoy substantive protections prior to water disconnection,1 pov-
erty-stricken people in Phiri with pre-paid meters have been forced to forgo 
such procedural protections – their water supply terminates automatically 
and immediately on exhaustion of the FBW or credit supply.
Determined to enjoy the same rights as rich people despite their poverty, 
in July 2006 Paki and Makoatsane, along with three other Phiri residents, 
formally launched an application challenging the constitutionality and law-
fulness of pre-paid water meters and the sufficiency of the FBW allocation.2 
The case, Mazibuko & Others v the City of Johannesburg & Others, was heard 
in the Johannesburg High Court between 3 and 5 December 2007. The deci-
sion was handed down as this article was about to be published, on 30 April 
2008. In a judgment groundbreaking for its sensitivity towards the lives of 
the poor and for the use of human rights as a mechanism to advance socio-
economic transformation in South Africa, High Court Judge Moroa Tsoka 
ruled in favour of the applicants. Finding the “prepayment water system in 
Phiri Township” to be “unconstitutional and unlawful”, the judge ordered 
1 In terms of bylaw 9c of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality Water Services By-Laws 
(28 April 2004), where a “consumer” with a conventional meter “fails to pay the amount due”, the 
council “may only discontinue supply to a consumer in arrears” after pursuing all of the following 
specific procedures: a “final demand notice”, the “opportunity to conclude an agreement with the 
Council for payment of the arrears amount in installments within 14 days of the date of the final 
demand notice”, and hand delivering or posting to the last recorded address a “final discontinuation 
notice informing such consumer that the provision of water services will be discontinued”. 
2 Although the application was formally launched in the Johannesburg High Court in July 2006, the 
litigation process began in 2004, with letters of demand to Johannesburg Water. The length of time 
it took for the case to be launched in court is an indication of how difficult it is (especially for civil 
society organisations and social movements) to mount a socio-economic rights case. In the end, the 
application comprised over 6 000 pages of record, filling some 20 lever arch files.
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the City to provide each applicant, and all other similarly placed residents 
of Phiri Township, with a “free basic water supply of 50 litres per person per 
day and the option of a metered supply installed at the cost of the City of 
Johannesburg”.3 Although this judgment is likely to be appealed by the City, 
and notwithstanding the ultimate outcome following an inevitably lengthy 
appeals process, the legal arguments advanced by the parties highlight 
important ideological fault lines between a progressive rights-based approach 
to water delivery on the one hand and a cost-recovery imperative on the other 
hand, which are worth examining.
The Phiri case is the first South African case in which the applicants have 
explicitly sought enforcement of their constitutional right of access to suf-
ficient water (section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution).4 For the applicants and 
their support organisations, the case has always been of critical importance 
in securing the constitutionally-guaranteed socio-economic rights of poor 
people. But, as explored in this article, the case also highlights the overall bias 
of water policy towards neoliberal characteristics. Yet, as appreciated by the 
applicants, critique is not enough; a strong set of alternative policy solutions 
should be considered, particularly in view of the courts’ reluctance to second-
guess policies, especially where no concrete alternatives are offered. With 
this in mind, the Phiri applicants specifically asked for (and were granted by 
the Tsoka judgment of 30 April 2008) a FBW supply of 50 litres per person 
per day (not 6000 litres per household per month), and the option of the kind 
of conventional metered water supply that exists throughout Johannesburg’s 
richer suburbs.
Moreover, their case represents a much greater challenge to neoliberalism: 
a refutation of the “politics of the parish pump” thesis – to borrow the phra-
seology of former Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) director 
general Mike Muller – that blames local victims (including underfunded 
municipalities and civil society protesters) for national and global neoliberal 
policy creep. At a time when the rate of demonstrations (under the Regulation 
of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993) recorded by SA Police Services was rising 
from around 6000 peryear (2004-05) to 10 000 per year (2005-07),5 President 
Thabo Mbeki specifically remarked, “If this problem of lack of capacity in 
municipal governance is not given the necessary attention, it can undermine 
our efforts to deepen democracy at the local level. (It) may bring about an 
unintended consequence of the development of a gulf between our municipal 
governments and the people.”6
3 Mazibuko & Others v the City of Johannesburg & Others (unreported case no 06/13865 in the Johan-
nesburg High Court) paras. 183.4-183.5.
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
5 Nqakula C “National Assembly Written Reply to Question 1834, No.43/2007”, 36/1/4/1/200700232, 
22 November 2007 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Cape Town.
6 Mtshali T “Sloppy municipal management a time bomb” 11 November 2006 SAPA. This mentality 
is also the preferred position of business; see, e.g., Bernstein A “Sombre messages written in fire” 
Business Day, 8 May (2007).
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In contrast to the strategy of Muller and Mbeki, which is to avoid central 
government responsibility for numerous local water crises, the applicants’ case 
argues for a universal shift in delivery practice with national policy implications 
that, in turn, is inspiring international interest in social resistance to water cor-
poratisation along progressive rights-based lines. The rights-based approach 
supported by the applicants and their community organisations is not the kind 
of market-friendly rights regime that, for example, allows water disconnections 
to poor communities, all the while cloaked in rights-rhetoric. Rather, the rights 
model ascribed to is one rooted in an understanding of power relations and 
structural inequalities,7 which views the South African Constitution as inher-
ently transformative.8 Such a rights-based model understands the Constitution 
(and South Africa)’s main imperatives to be the advancement of human dignity 
and the achievement of equality.9 According to this approach, outside luxury 
consumption, water is a social good rather than a commercial good.
At a very basic level, instead of neoliberal commodified water, the appli-
cants seek decommodified water. Simply summarised, ‘commodifying’ water 
entails:
• highlighting its role mainly as an economic good
• attempting to reduce cross-subsidization that distorts the end-user price 
of water (tariff)
• insisting upon 100% cost recovery on operating and maintenance costs 
(even if capital investments are subsidised)
• promoting a severely limited form of means-tested subsidization
• establishing shadow prices for water as an environmental good
• solving problems associated with state control of water (inefficiencies, 
excessive administrative centralization, lack of competition, unaccounted-
for-water, weak billing and political interference), and in the process
• fostering the conditions for water privatization.
In contrast, ‘decommodifying’ water entails: 
• assuring that there is a universal free lifeline tariff that allows all consum-
ers to have a decent supply available every day
• valorising the public goods and merit goods associated with water (e.g. 
public health benefits, gender equity, economic multipliers, environmen-
7 Baxi U “What happens next is up to you: Human rights at risk in dams and development” (2001) 16 
American University International Law Review 1507-1529.
8 Dugard J “Judging the judges: Towards an appropriate role for the judiciary in South Africa’s trans-
formation”, (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 965-981. The transformative nature of 
the Constitution is evident in the preamble (‘Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society 
based on democratic values, social justice …’), the founding provisions (at s 1:‘The Republic of 
South Africa is … founded on the following values: (a) human dignity, the achievement of equality 
…), and also in the equality provisions of s 9, which explicitly sanction positive discrimination in 
the interests of equity and justice on an individual or collective basis (at s 9(2): “Equality includes 
the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, 
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken”).
9 Constitution (fn 4 above) s 1(a).
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tal factors and geographical desegregation), which are typically ignored in 
the private commodity model of water consumption
• imposing a luxury consumption charge on wealthy and over-consump-
tive households, so as to discourage high volume use (for conservation 
purposes and to cross-subsidise universal free lifeline water)
• providing legislative and even constitutional protection for consumers so 
as to realize their “right” to water in a manner that empowers citizens and 
workers, not bureaucrats.
The difference between the two approaches is partly geographical, because from 
2001-06, Johannesburg’s water was run by a Paris for-profit supplier, Suez.
2 JOHANNESBURG WATER, PARISIAN PROFITS
One reason for global interest in the case is the role of one of the world’s 
largest water management firms. Johannesburg’s early-2000s retail water 
restructuring was mainly influenced by the Paris-based Suez, which control-
led the Johannesburg Water Management (Jowam) contractor to the city from 
2001-06. Jowam managed the Johannesburg Water (Pty) Ltd., a company 
established in December 2000 to discharge the City of Johannesburg’s water 
service delivery functions. Although functioning at arms-length from the City, 
Johannesburg Water is a publicly-owned corporation with the City as its only 
share-holder. As a public company delivering a public service, Johannesburg 
Water is bound to discharge all the constitutional and legislative duties 
including the City’s obligations regarding the poor. But until 2006, when the 
Paris connection was severed (partly because of pressure from aggrieved 
residents), Johannesburg Water relied on Jowam for global cutting-edge man-
agerial techniques, especially in relation to “demand-side management” of 
water, which effectively meant limiting consumption by low-income people. 
Those techniques remain in place in 2008, and have been extended to many 
other municipalities across the continent, with SA firms like Conlog supplying 
pre-paid water meters across Africa.
No one would deny that Suez faced severe structural and political prob-
lems at the outset of its contract. For example, even before 2000, civil society 
engagement with Johnnesburg Water and Jowam was tainted. The City of 
Johannesburg’s commercialisation agenda was predetermined to the extent 
that the ANC metropolitan leadership fired prominent city councilor Trevor 
Ngwane, head of the regional African National Congress (ANC) in Soweto, 
when in September 1999 he wrote a newspaper article criticizing the forthcom-
ing water contract. Subsequent public debates and protests included mass 
labour marches (at one stage in 2000 leading to the mobilisation of 20 000 
municipal workers) and the rise of a new movement – the Anti-Privatisation 
Forum (APF) in mid-2000 – just as the contract was formalised.10
10 Bond P “Johannesburg’s Resurgent Urban Social Movements” in Gibson N (Ed), Challenging Hege-
mony: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa and the Quest for a New Humanity (2006) 
Trenton Africa World Press.
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Beginning its work in 2001, Suez inherited a dysfunctional system in low-
income areas, especially the shack settlements which are home to nearly a 
third of the city’s 3.2 million residents: 65% use communal standpipes and 
20% receive small amounts from water tankers, while the other 15% have 
outdoor yard taps. For sanitation, 52% have dug pit latrines themselves, 45% 
rely on chemical toilets, 2% have communal flush toilets and 1% use ablu-
tion blocks. Needless to say, these conditions are both particularly hostile to 
women and children, and breed disease at a time when Johannesburg’s HIV 
rate has soared above 25% and when cholera and diarrhoea epidemics are 
still spreading. For Human Development Index comparisons that combine 
income, education and mortality, Johannesburg’s white residents rate 44, just 
below the average of rich countries, 45, while the city’s black residents rate 
32, just above South Africa as a whole.11
Instead of expanding supply to these un-served areas, Suez’s response to 
poverty was to take part in massive water disconnections. At peak in early 
2002, just before community resistance became an effective countervailing 
force, Johannesburg officials were disconnecting more than 20 000 house-
holds per month from power and water.12 For municipal bureaucrats and 
Suez, disconnecting low-income people and maintaining low water/sanita-
tion standards so long after liberation was part of its strategy, quite simply, to 
save money. Johannesburg managers were also reluctant to offer a genuine free 
lifeline supply and rising block tariff so as to redistribute water from rich to poor, 
and simultaneously encourage water conservation. The reason for maintain-
ing relatively low marginal price increases for high volume consumption (and 
high price increases for consumption from 6-10 kl/ household/ month) was to 
mop up excess water supply created by Lesotho dam cross-catchment water 
transfers. During the late-1990s, Johannesburg also became liable for the Katse 
megadam debt repayments to the World Bank and other financiers, resulting in 
a spectacular 69% increase from 1996-99 in the nominal cost of water purchased 
from the Rand Water Board, the bulk supplier of water to Johannesburg Water. 
By the time the Igoli 2002 municipal corporatisation strategy was established 
in 1999, Johannesburg’s water prices became more financially regressive than 
during apartheid, but due to a flatter slope in the block tariff, disadvantaging 
low-income, low-volume consumers.
11 Bond P “Johannesburg: Of Gold and Gangsters” in Davis M Monk D (Eds) Evil Paradises: The 
Dream worlds of Neoliberalism New York, New Press (2007); Bond P “Johannesburg Infrastructure” 
in Segbers K et al (Eds) Public Problems, Private Solutions? New Trends from Globalizing Cities in the 
South (2005) Aldershot Ashgate.
12 Bond P Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest (2002) London 
Merlin Press; Sunday Times Gauteng Metro 19 May 2002.
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However, as discussed in more detail below, a free basic lifeline was promised 
as national water policy in 2001, amounting to 6,000 liters of free water each 
month for each household. At the local level such as in Johannesburg, this 
policy translates to 6kl FBW per account-holder per stand. The DWAF website 
claims that “100%” of Johannesburg residents are beneficiaries of the free basic 
water provision, but this is impossible, given how few low-income people have 
their own house or yard connection, and given how many people have faced 
water disconnections due to inability to pay their water bills.13 From a progres-
sive perspective, the main pricing debate is whether the free lifeline block (the 
FBW allocation) is adequate (and fairly administered) and whether, following 
the FBW zero-rated block, the tariff curve rises in an excessively ‘convex’ or 
sufficiently ‘concave’ manner.
DWAF’s national FBW policy derives from the December 2000 municipal 
elections, which was held in the wake of rising protest and alienation, as well 
as the cholera epidemic, and was meant to fulfill this promise: “The ANC-led 
local government will provide all residents with a free basic amount of water, 
electricity and other municipal services so as to help the poor. Those who use 
more than the basic amounts, will pay for the extra they use”. Johannesburg 
reinterpreted this otherwise progressive mandate regressively, however, by 
adopting a relatively steep-rising convex tariff curve, in contrast to a concave 
curve starting with a larger lifeline block, which would have better served the 
interests of lower-income residents. In 2003, the second tier of the block tariff 
(7-10 kl/household/month) was raised by 32%, while the third tier (11-15 kl/
household/month) was lowered by 2%, during a period of roughly 10% infla-
tion, which was the amount by which higher tier tariffs increased. The dramatic 
increase in their per-unit charges in the second block meant that there was 
no meaningful difference to their average monthly bills even after the first free 
6000 liters. Moreover, the marginal tariff price for industrial and commercial 
users of water, while higher than residential, actually declines after large-vol-
ume consumption is reached.
Johannesburg’s poor residents were hit hard by the price shifts. According to 
a front page New York Times story in May 2003, Suez officials “acknowledged 
that in communities like these, billing people for water has been like squeezing 
water from a stone… Orange Farm women, who live by doing other people’s 
laundry, said they barely had enough money to pay for food and school fees. 
Many of them already have prepaid electricity meters in their homes, and 
they say their families end up in the dark for several days each month”.14 In 
such a context, with ubiquitous illegal water and electricity connections (the 
bypass) and after numerous street protests failed, several residents backed by 
civic groups and progressive lawyers, took Johannesburg to the High Court in 
a case filed in 2006 and heard in late-2007.
13 Krystall N “Johannesburg’s Water Tariff Structure” Masters Research Report University of the Wit-
watersrand Graduate School of Public and Development Management, Johannesburg (2003).
14 Thomson G “Water tap often shut to South Africa’s poor” New York Times 29 May 2003.
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3  MAZIBUKO & OTHERS V CITY OF JOHANNESBURG & 
OTHERS
The Phiri application was brought by five unemployed, poverty-stricken resi-
dents of Phiri, on behalf of themselves, their households and all residents of 
Phiri who are in a similar position, as well as everyone in the public interest. 
The applicants hoped to successfully challenge two specific aspects of Johan-
nesburg’s water delivery service, which negatively impact on their lives. First, 
they sought the option of conventional water meters to replace the pre-paid 
water meters and, second, they wanted to access sufficient water to cover 
their basic needs. Through such specific measures the applicants seek, more 
broadly, to advance a policy reorientation towards viewing water primarily as 
a social good. Their application has been supported by the Coalition Against 
Water Privatisation (CAWP), a collection of community organisations strug-
gling against the negative effects of current water services delivery on the 
poor. The applicants are represented by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
(CALS), a human rights advocacy and public interest litigation centre at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. The respondents are the City of Johannes-
burg, Johannesburg Water (Pty) Ltd. and the Ministry of Water Affairs and 
Forestry.
Starting in March 2004, the applicants, along with thousands of residents 
of Phiri, were forced to accept either pre-paid water meters or standpipes 
(outside yard taps) as the only options besides complete disconnection of 
their previous water supply. The previous water supply, a hangover from 
apartheid days when municipal officials were more concerned about politi-
cal activism in Soweto than regulating water consumption, was an unlimited 
amount of water for which a flat-rate was levied, as though every household 
consumed 20kl of water each month. Formally, this ‘deemed consumption’ 
system was inequitable in that, regardless of the amount of water consumed, 
every household was charged the same flat-rate. Informally, the system was 
acceptable to the residents because, again as a legacy of Soweto’s activist past, 
the municipality neither strictly enforced credit control, nor did it disconnect 
water as a result of non-payment. From the City’s perspective, however, ris-
ing arrears and unlimited water consumption became increasingly untenable 
after 1994, as the imperatives of cost-recovery rapidly overlaid apartheid’s 
imperatives of racism.
So, while households in rich suburbs continued to be able to access as 
much water as they liked – without any pressure to conserve – for their gar-
dens, swimming pools, fish ponds, baths, and so forth, the City began to target 
water consumption in Soweto and other ‘deemed consumption areas’ (town-
ships). To this end, in 2002, the City launched an alternative supply strategy 
for Soweto, Operation Gcin’amanzi.15 This was an “immediate, intensive and 
comprehensive intervention on a number of fronts” that sought to remedy the 
problems of “over-supply”, lack of “ownership” of water consumption by resi-
15 meaning to “conserve water” in isiZulu.
9
THE CASE OF JOHANNESBURG WATER
dents and “a non-payment paradigm amongst consumers”.16 Whereas other 
municipalities had remedied deemed consumption through conventional 
metering, the City of Johannesburg was determined to ensure that residents 
of Soweto would not access more water than the FBW amount without first 
paying for it, instead of getting the additional water on credit the way resi-
dents of mainly white neighbourhoods in Johannesburg do. According to its 
own documentation, Johannesburg Water was “intent on adopting pre-paid 
water metering as the preferred service delivery option to be implemented 
in the deemed consumption areas of supply”, because “prepayment can be 
considered to be a water demand management tool”.17 Demand management 
was perceived by the City to be critical to the objective of promoting “savings 
in water purchases by Johannesburg Water [from Rand Water]”,18 and to the 
broader goal of improving the financial positions of the City of Johannesburg 
and Johannesburg Water.19
Seeking to ‘reduce demand’ for water among Soweto residents, as well as to 
improve the City’s financial situation, and without consulting affected residents 
before taking the decision to rollout pre-paid meters en mass, Johannesburg 
Water began the bulk infrastructure construction work for the installation of 
pre-paid meters in Phiri (site of the Soweto pilot rollout) on 11 August 2003. 
Individual house connections began in February 2004. However, progress 
was slower than anticipated because of the rising resistance from residents 
who had heard about the negative ramifications of pre-paid meters from 
people in Orange Farm informal settlement.20 Under the auspices of the APF 
and community organisations, such as the Soweto Electricity Crisis Commit-
tee and Concerned Phiri Residents Committee, spontaneous protests turned 
into mass action, with many residents simply refusing to allow Johannesburg 
Water to install the meters. As a result, many residents were left without 
water at all for many months in 2004. Later, in desperation, most of those 
who refused the meters were forced into accepting standpipes, which allowed 
an unlimited supply of water for free (debunking the water conservation front 
of Operation Gcin’Amanzi) but involved much inconvenience for households 
because of no longer having an in-house connection, for example, people 
with standpipes now have to carry buckets of water to flush their toilets, 
which were not designed for an external water supply.
By the end of 2004 most households in Phiri had been forced to accept 
either pre-paid meters or standpipes. All were forced to relinquish the previ-
ous unlimited water supply, which was discontinued. To sweeten this bitter 
pre-paid meter pill, Operation Gcin’amanzi was accompanied by municipal 
16 Undated report on “Operation Gcin’Amanzi” included in the minutes of Meeting of the Operations 
and Procurement Committee of Johannesburg Water (27 November 2002) 1 (copy of report with 
author).
17 Ibid (fn 16 above) 3.
18 Ibid.
19 First and Second Respondents’ Heads of Argument, Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others. (16 November 2007) para 17.8.
20 While Phiri was the pilot of Operation Gcin’Amanzi in Soweto, pre-paid meters had already been 
installed throughout Orange Farm. 
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debt write-off, contingent on not tampering with the meter, and a publicity 
campaign around the extension to Phiri households of 6kl FBW supply, as 
was already being provided through conventional meters to the rich suburbs 
of Johannesburg.21 But there was no sweetening of the bitter effects of pre-paid 
meters in Phiri, where the majority of residents survive on government grants 
and cannot afford to spend any money on water. One result of Gcin’amanzi 
for many households is being without water for days and even weeks at a 
time every month. With average households of thirteen or more people, many 
of whom are People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), the standard FBW is 
insufficient to meet basic needs. The FBW is allocated per stand (as opposed 
to per individual), so is biased to smaller households, e.g. white families with 
fewer children who moved to Johannesburg’s proliferating gated communi-
ties. As a result, Phiri residents must make undignified and unhealthy choices 
about basic hygiene and health. For example, carers of PLWHA must choose 
between bathing their patients or washing their soiled bed sheets, and par-
ents must choose between providing their children with body washes before 
they go to school or flushing the toilet.
For the many large households in Phiri who exhaust their FBW supply 
before the end of the month and are too poor to afford additional water credit, 
the ultimate punishment is the pre-paid meter’s automatic and immediate 
disconnection. Unlike conventional meters in rich suburbs, which provide 
reasonable warning of a proposed disconnection and an opportunity to make 
representation (in the form of notification in red writing at the bottom of the 
monthly bill that the account is in arrears), pre-paid meter disconnection 
occurs automatically and without warning following the exhaustion of the 
FBW supply. As a consequence, households are often taken by surprise. If the 
disconnection occurs during the night or over a weekend when water credit 
vendors are closed, the household has to go without water until the shops 
are open again. If the household does not have money for additional water, it 
must borrow either money or water from neighbours in order to survive. The 
continuous infringements to dignity and health are serious, for a direct risk to 
life is posed in the event of a fire, as Paki witnessed.
Regardless of such suffering, it is clear from its submissions in the Phiri case 
that the City remains overwhelmingly fixated on the “principle of payment”. 
Stressing its financial responsibilities (it is important to note that nowhere 
in its submissions did the City argue that it does not have the resources to 
provide poor residents with sufficient and appropriately-administered water), 
the City relied on an arsenal of financial management-related legislation 
such as the Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, the Local 
Government Municipal Finance Management Act 176 of 2004, the Local 
Government Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 and the National Credit 
21 In the City of Johannesburg FBW is a universal, one-size-fits-all benefit – every account-holder 
automatically receives the rebate each month as a 6kl discount on the property’s water bill. In 
other words, if a single rich businesswoman in Sandton uses less than 6000 litres per month, she 
pays nothing for water even though she is well-placed to afford high water tariffs and she probably 
consumes more water on a per capita basis than most poor people in Phiri. 
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Act 35 of 2005 to suggest that its hands were tied regarding any capacity to 
do more for the poor. For example, in the course of its legal argument, the 
City highlighted the stipulation in section 4(1)(c)(i) of the Local Government 
Municipal Systems Act that the municipality has the right to “finance the 
affairs of the municipality by charging fees for services”. And, in connection 
with its justification of the rollout of pre-paid meters only to poor areas, the 
City argued that section 80 of the National Credit Act, pertaining to “reckless 
credit”, precludes the City from entering into conventional credit metered 
agreements with poor residents in Phiri with large municipal arrears.
Leaving aside the fact, as recognised by Judge Tsoka in the judgement, that 
in South Africa any constitutional provision, for example the right to equality 
or the right to sufficient water, will always trump other legislation unless it 
can be shown to be a limitation of the right that is “reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”,22 in advancing this credit control argument the City ignored two 
critical facts. First, Phiri residents with pre-paid meters have already been 
granted a debt write-off (an incentive to accept the pre-paid meter). Second, 
on the City’s own admission, the worst debtors in Johannesburg are not the 
poor, but are “government and institutional bodies whose payment record 
and responsiveness to credit control measures is poor”.23 Yet, there is no 
suggestion that the City plans to impose pre-paid meters on such government 
and institutional bodies. Tellingly, the City’s argument about the rollout of 
pre-paid meters was often couched in a concern about how much money 
has already been sunk into pre-paid meters for Soweto (the City continued 
to rollout pre-paids through the rest of Soweto even after the application 
was launched). According to this argument, any rights’ violations of pre-paid 
meters should be overlooked in favour of the financial and administrative-
convenience rationales that “if successful, the present application will have 
enormous adverse implications for the City in that it will fundamentally 
disrupt the core aspect of the strategic planning of the City and Johannes-
burg Water”24. Put more plainly by Gerald Dumas, the Managing Director of 
Johannesburg Water, “it is really difficult to conceive of the cost of unravelling 
some or all of [Operation Gcin’amanzi] in terms of removal of meters, instal-
lation of alternative metering sources, and this would seriously impact on 
Johannesburg Water’s finances and sustainability”.25 It is worth noting that, 
in the City’s submission, it cost Johannesburg R335 901 036.65 to rollout pre-
paid meters throughout Soweto,26 which clearly represents a very substantial 
investment to protect.
22 Constitution (fn 4 above) s36.
23 Johannesburg Water Business Plans (2003-2005)2. 
24 Answering affidavit of Karen Brits, Director: Legal & Compliance of the City of Johannesburg. (25 
January 2007) para 12.1, Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others: www.law.wits.ac.za/
cals.
25 Answering affidavit of Gerald Dumas, Managing Director of Johannesburg Water (20 January 2007) 
para 34, Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others: www.law.wits.ac.za.
26 Answering affidavit of Karen Brits, Director: Legal & Compliance of the City of Johannesburg (25 
January 2007) para 27.4.5, Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others: www.law.wits.ac.za/
cals.
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In stark contrast to the City’s cost-recovery preoccupation, the applicants in 
the Phiri water rights case approached the issue from a basic needs- and pro-
gressive human rights-perspective. Using legal arguments based on the South 
African rights to water, equality, health, dignity and administrative justice, the 
application challenges the lawfulness of the pre-paid meters in terms of their 
failure to provide procedural protections prior to automatic disconnection. 
Pursuing the same rights-based approach, the application also argues that 
the City’s monthly FBW allocation, which aims to provide each person in a 
household of 8 with 25 litres of water per person per day, is insufficient to 
meet the basic needs of urban human beings. It is, therefore, according to the 
applicants, not a reasonable policy. This is for three related reasons.
First, there is no rational basis for the 6kl amount, as this allocation is 
not based on any rational analysis of the quantity of water needed by poor 
people in various spatial settings to enjoy a dignified existence. Rather, as 
clarified in the City’s pleadings, and particularly the answering affidavit of Neil 
Macleod, the 6kl amount is based on an administrative convenience. In his 
answering affidavit Neil Macleod (Head: Water Sanitation of the eThekwini 
Municipality) explains how eThekwini’s 1997 model of free basic water provi-
sion became the basis for DWAF’s subsequent national FBW policy. For this 
reason it is worth outlining the genesis of the eThekwini model, as it reveals 
a total absence of a rights or needs-based approach to water provision, which 
was adopted by DWAF, and by the City of Johannesburg, as the national 
policy without any subsequent needs-analysis. As outlined by Macleod, in 
1997, having decided to address the issue of water provision to informal set-
tlements, Durban Metropolitan Council (subsequently re-named eThekwini) 
found that “approximately 7 litres of water was used per person per day as 
this was generally the amount that an individual could physically carry and 
could afford”.27 Based on this observation, and knowing that the average 
household contained 7 people, the City began to provide a 200 litre drum at 
the front door of each shack, which “could be filled once a day with clean 
drinking water … at a minimal charge”.28 However, during 1998, “it became 
apparent that the amount of money that was collected by the Council for the 
water supply was in fact equivalent to or less than the costs of administering 
the collection of the amounts from the relevant communities” and, for this 
reason, the City began to provide the amount for free.29 In summary, the basis 
of the national FBW policy was a practice by Durban Municipality of provid-
ing 200 litre drums of water to each resident of informal settlements (because 
this approximated the amount they had previously been able to carry each 
day) without charge because it turned out to be cheaper to dispense the water 
for free than to administer the billing and payments for it.
27 Answering affidavit of Neil Macleod, Head: Water and Sanitation of the eThekwini Municipality 
(8 January 2007) para 9, Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others: www.law.wits.ac.za/
cals. 
28 Answering affidavit Karin Brits (fn 24 above), paras 7-11. 
29 Answering affidavit Karin Brits (fn 24 above) para 12.
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The second reason for the applicants disputing the reasonableness of the 
FBW policy is that it is an inflexible one-size-fits-all policy. In terms of the 
City’s FBW policy, every household in Johannesburg – regardless of size or 
need – receives 6kl per month. The applicants argue that this policy automat-
ically discriminates against large poor multi-dwelling households in which 
everyone has to share the same allocation of water. In Phiri for example, 
where the average property has more than 8 people (recent research shows 
that there is an average of 13 people per property in Phiri), each person gets 
below the 25 litres per person per day.
Thirdly, the application argues that, in any event, 25 litres per person per 
day – just two flushes of a toilet – is insufficient to meet the basic water needs 
of poor people. Based on the expert evidence of Peter Gleick, a California-
based expert on water rights and sufficiency, the application argues that the 
City should provide 50 litres of FBW per person per day. Gleick and his col-
leagues30 confirm that in conditions such as Phiri, the minimum amount of 
water to ensure a basic standard of living is 50 litres per capita per day (lcd), 
broken down as follows:
• Minimum for drinking: 5lcd
• Basic sanitation:  20lcd
• Basic bathing:  15lcd
• Basic food preparation: 10lcd
TOTAL    50lcd
Notably, the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 
South Africa’s ruling ANC called for a “medium-term” allocation of water 
of 50-60 lcd. The reality is that in Phiri, many people have to survive on far 
less than the 25 lcd that the RDP promised as a short-term emergency meas-
ure. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), access to water of 
below 20lcd carries with it a “high level of health concern” and is insufficient 
to cover “laundry/bathing unless carried out at source”.31
For the people of Phiri and their supporters, the case is not only of critical 
importance in securing access to sufficient water, and procedural safeguards 
against water disconnections, for poor people. In addition, it represents a 
challenge to the degradation of the RDP by neoliberal bureaucrats whose 
national strategies undermined the progressive potential of the ANC, driving 
it from social-democratic electoral uhuru of April 27 1994 to the explicitly 
neoliberal White Paper of December 1994 which made “cost recovery” on 
water’s operating and maintenance costs – and resistance thereto – the under-
lying logic of so much else that would follow in South African hydropolitics.
30 Gleick P The World’s Water 2002-2003: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources et al (2000) 
Washington, DC: Island Press.
31 Of these rights-based arguments, Judge Tsoka focused on the sufficiency argument in his judgment. 
Accepting Peter Gleick’s international expertise (which the City had unfoundedly questioned), the 
judge ordered the City to provide 50 litres of FBW per person per day to the applicants and others 
similarly situated in Phiri.
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4  EXPLAINING WATER POLITICS: MIKE MULLER’S 
NATIONAL ‘PARISH PUMP’
Who is ultimately to blame for the problems faced in Phiri and hundreds of 
other similar settings: local or national administrators and policy-makers? 
To answer properly is a prerequisite for fixing the problems. The strategy of 
Phiri activists, as part of the national Coalition Against Water Privatisation, 
is to force a rethink on both technology and water pricing, so that not only 
Johannesburg Water but all other municipalities are threatened with consti-
tutional cases using water rights, in a manner that also implicates national 
government so as to compel state policy change.
The question in the water sector, as in so many other areas of social policy, 
is whether on the one hand existing national policies and legislation are 
sufficient to deliver the promised goods, and hence problems lie in munici-
pal-scale implementation, which is conventional wisdom (e.g. as promoted 
by Thabo Mbeki regularly) – or on the other hand, whether the policies and 
laws themselves require radical change to excise their neoliberal character. 
Perhaps the most sophisticated version of the former argument is Mike Mull-
er’s 2007 article,32 whose primary aim appears to be shifting the responsibility 
for systemic problems to municipal officials.
As the leading water official during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and as 
someone who has garnered a strong reputation as a critic of explicit privatisa-
tion amongst international water professionals, Muller offers a fascinating 
analysis which, implicitly, addresses the core power relations that surface in 
the Phiri lawsuit. Muller insists that the South African government has purpo-
sively, carefully constructed a development state providing water in the best 
traditions, combining social-democratic commitments to human rights and 
construction of an efficient delivery system, notwithstanding potentially dan-
gerous pressures from the right and left, and from municipal incompetence 
as well as global private profit-seekers. Because it is the strongest analysis to 
date that would give credence to the state’s position, and does so ostensibly 
from a rights-based perspective, Muller’s work deserves careful study. In other 
words, Muller’s analysis appears to us as the most convincing and heartfelt 
articulation of a rights-based argument on behalf of existing policies. It was no 
accident that he was recalled to depose to an answering affidavit in support 
of DWAF in the Mazibuko et al case.
We argue that although Johannesburg Water is not cited in Muller’s article, 
the national policy which he designed and implemented made it logical for 
the city – and many other South African municipalities – to deny water to poor 
people. This occurred directly within the scope of Muller’s paradigm – DWAF’s 
1994 Water Supply and Sanitation White Paper, in which he played a central 
role, especially in insisting upon 100% recovery of operating/maintenance 
32 2007 Progress in Development Studies journal article “Parish pump politics: the politics of water 
supply in South Africa”.
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costs33 – notwithstanding his stated hostility to the large international water 
privatisers and a subsequent revision of the policy so as to permit a token 
FBW allocation. Indeed it is particularly where Muller distances himself from 
the commodification of water, that a rebuttal is in order, for this process – 
with its necessary corrollary, limitation of water consumption by the poor – is 
indeed the central cause of the problems faced by Phiri residents.
In his article, Muller locates himself on seemingly sensible, practical mid-
dle ground, between extremes ranging from “economists of the neo-liberal 
schools to the post-Modernists of the global social movements”. Indeed, “par-
ish pump politics” is an often derogatory term used to describe the use and, 
usually, the abuse of local politics focused on practical issues.34 But invoking 
the ‘local’ as his defense for both successes and defeats, Muller is not without 
an overarching rights-based rhetoric himself, for he claims to have operation-
alised the ubuntu philosophy of Water Minister Ronnie Kasrils, whom Muller 
served from 1999-2004 following the earlier (1994-99) reign of Kader Asmal 
who then became head of the World Commission on Dams (1998-2001) 
33 The 1994 policy insists, “where poor communities are not able to afford basic services, government 
may subsidise the cost of construction of basic minimum services but not the operating, maintenance 
or replacement costs” (emphasis added). Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1994), “Water 
Supply and Sanitation White Paper”, Cape Town, p. 19. This crucial point was repeated in a 1997 
revision: “To promote the efficient use of water, the policy will be to charge users for the full financial 
costs of providing access to water, including infrastructure development and catchment manage-
ment activities.” Department of Water Affairs and Forestry “White Paper on a National Water Policy 
for South Africa” Pretoria (1997) 4.
34 Muller M “Parish pump politics: the politics of water supply in South Africa” (2007) 7, 1 Prog-
ress in Development Studies p.34. We offer one minor clarification about our bias in addressing 
Muller: it comes not from the alleged ‘post-Modernists of the global social movements’. Because 
post-modernism does not recognise transcendental universal processes such as commodification, 
decommodification struggles, or social movement formation at the global scale, much less rights-
based rhetorics, Muller early on reveals a tendency to misunderstand and mislabel those outside 
the water technocracy. Because Muller’s commodified water policy and penchant for disconnections 
caused division and despair (not to mention death), one of the world’s strongest anti-privatisation 
movements arose in South Africa to oppose him. But that movement has regularly advocated social-
ism and the hydrological trappings of modernity (not post-Modernism): at least 50 liters per person of 
water each day, a waterborne sanitation system, and human dignity. These water services are denied 
this movement’s constituents by the “economists of the neo-liberal schools”, especially World 
Bank teams which from November 1994 were already setting limits on SA’s national infrastructure 
policy. See Bond (fn 12 above) 2000. Cities of Gold, Townships of Coal, Trenton, Africa World Press. 
Instead of opposing those economists, Muller graciously implemented their recommendations until 
circumstances changed in 2000 and, even then imposed a FBW policy that, we argue, undermined 
water rights rather than secured them. Moreover, Muller (fn 34 above) then argues that ‘the anti-
privatisers, stung by the challenge that privatisation was not really an issue since only 5 out of 
284 municipalities had privatised their water services, conflated the issues of cost recovery for and 
commodification of water with privatisation. This further confused the issue, since they had, in 
other contexts, supported cost recovery (from the well-off and from farmers).’ In fact, for no SA 
municipalities suffered formal “privatisation” insofar as water piping and related infrastructure is 
sold outright to private firms; instead, the all-encompassing commodification of water applied to 
all 284 municipalities, in large part thanks to Muller’s 1994 White Paper. The anti-privatisers cor-
rectly saw the commodification process as the first step to municipal commercial subcontracting, 
and beginning in 1994 with the RDP, called for FBW as one antidote to this process. To get FBW 
would require, however, that much higher prices be applied to large-volume users (‘the well-off and 
farmers’), so as to effect cross-subsidisation. There is no confusion or contradiction here, except 
in Muller’s own thought processes. To further blame the activists’ anti-privatisation discourse, as 
Muller (fn 34 above) immediately does, upon the “Northern countries” assiduous promotion of 
environmentally sustainable policies (which provide useful non-tariff mechanisms for promoting 
their goods, services and other interests)’ is simply bizarre.
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and SA Minister of Education (1999-2004). Muller cites Kasrils approvingly: 
“We do not help the poor because we are charitable. We help them because 
they are part of us and we are nothing without each other.” In that spirit, 
Muller and his department claim to have “provided access to water-supply 
infrastructure to over 10 million people” from 1994-2006, notwithstanding 
barriers including self-serving municipal officials, patronage-oriented politi-
cians and misguided leftist protesters.35
These are the essential components of the “Parish pump politics” argument, 
and compel scrutiny. But the rights talk disguises a central fact: Muller was the 
most powerful policymaker and manager from 1994-2005, during the time of the 
country’s worst-ever recorded cholera crisis. A spate of disconnections in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal Province was at the pandemic’s epicentre, although Muller denies 
the well-documented correlation.36 Nevertheless in 2001, Muller conceded on 
national television that his policy was “too market-oriented”,37 and, consistent 
with the African National Congress promise of FBW in the 2000 municipal elec-
tions, he permitted a slight adjustment away from the full cost-recovery policy (for 
operating and maintenance expenses) that he and his colleagues had imposed in 
the 1994 White Paper. But as argued below, the turn to FBW was not sufficient 
to ensure that a large proportion of South Africans had their constitutional rights 
to water met, and in the case of Durban actually led to less affordable water 
consumed by low-income people in 2004 compared to 1997.
5 LOCAL WATER DISCONNECTIONS
Consider the ongoing controversies over water connections and disconnec-
tions, which not only have provoked dramatic community protests, but also 
provided a central reason for Johannesburg Water’s adoption of pre-paid 
(self-disconnecting) meters. It is important to ask, how many South Africans 
actually got access to water since liberation from apartheid in 1994, and still 
have it today? Tragically, we simply do not know. No one disputes that tens 
of thousands of communal water taps were installed by government and its 
delivery agents, but no one knows how many still operate, as a result of systems 
35 Muller (fn 34 above) 40, 34.
36 Muller (fn 34 above) 40-41. According to Muller, “Cut-offs were also linked by critics to outbreaks of 
diseases such as cholera and typhoid, again highlighting challenges of interpretation and manage-
ment. The cholera epidemiology suggested that it was spread mainly from person to person in the 
unhygienic conditions characteristic of poverty, since the epidemic (which had moved down the 
East African coast over the previous year) spread along lines of communication rather than along 
water supply lines or rivers.” In contrast, a Sunday Times press report (9 October 2000) confirmed 
“a startling picture emerged of the sequence of events that led up to the [cholera] outbreak around 
Ngwelezane. Authorities discovered that some areas were still receiving free water in terms of a 
17-year initiative of the former KwaZulu government to deal with the 1983/4 drought. “It was even-
tually noticed, and it was decided to switch off the supply”, said the chief executive of the Uthungulu 
Regional Council, [Mr] B.B. Biyela. “The people were given sufficient warning and the supply was 
cut off at the beginning of August”. The first cases indicating cholera were noticed in Matshana and 
Nqutshini in the second week of August. The first case confirmed was on August 19.” For more, 
see Bond, P. “The Neoliberal Roots of South Africa’s Cholera Epidemic”, in M.Fort, M.Mercer and 
O.Gish, Sickness and Wealth: The Corporate Assault on Global Health (2004) (Eds) Boston, South 
End Press.
37 Interview, SABC tv show “Newsmakers”, 14 January 2001.
17
THE CASE OF JOHANNESBURG WATER
that broke due to funding shortfalls for operating and maintenance expenses. 
Those shortfalls were enormous, because Muller and colleagues set the price 
of water at the level of full cost recovery in the new government’s first water 
White Paper. Without substantial subsidies, naturally the systems fell apart.
Denying sufficient subsidies to people was one way to effect disconnec-
tions. But more explicitly, in October 1995, World Bank water expert John 
Roome told Asmal and Muller that national government needed to establish 
“a credible threat of cutting service’ to those who were not paying their water 
bills.38 After reviewing the subsequent four years of policy and practice, in 
1999 Roome and his Bank colleagues declared that they had been ‘instru-
mental in facilitating a radical revision in South Africa’s approach to bulk water 
management”.39 One reason such a boast must be taken seriously and also 
applied to retail water management, was that, as a result of a new, unduly 
harsh national policy on disconnections, millions of households experienced 
cuts in municipal water services due to nonpayment.
Muller himself has conceded that in 2003 alone, 275 000 households were 
disconnected from water services at least once due to inability to pay,40 which 
amounts to 1.5 million or more people, and these do not include people 
whose pre-paid meters ran out at a time of insufficient funds to replenish 
water supplies (i.e., self-disconnection). Subsequently, in his complicated 
reinterpretation of these figures for Progress in Development Studies, Muller 
minimises the survey figures that DWAF and the Human Sciences Research 
Council produced in 2004:
“When asked ‘In the past year how often did you experience interruptions of the water 
service?’, 2.6 percent of respondents reported interruptions ‘at least once a month’ and 
a further 15 percent ‘several times a year’. However, only 7 percent of interruptions were 
reported to be ‘for non-payment’. Instead, 38.9 percent reported that they were inter-
rupted for repairs and 39.3 percent that ‘it just stopped’”.41
There is a big difference between Muller’s 2004 interpretation of the DWAF/
HSRC data (1.5 million people disconnected in 2003 due to non-payment) and 
his 2007 revision (roughly 7 million people affected by cutoffs in 2003 but only 
500 000 for known reasons of non-payment). The figures might be reconciled 
if some of the 39.3 percent (roughly 2.8 million people) who said they didn’t 
know why there were disconnected were simply unaware of their payment sta-
tus. Given the chaotic status of municipal billing, especially in Johannesburg, 
and post offices service delivery deficits in townships, many of which lack street 
addresses, this is a reasonable hypothesis. The onus is on Muller to provide 
clearer data if he wants to continue to attack David McDonald’s 2001 estimate 
of one million people disconnected per year, a number that now seems to be 
50% too generous to government.42 In short, regarding the crucial claim of 
38 Roome J “Water Pricing and Management: World Bank Presentation to the SA Water Conservation 
Conference”, unpublished paper South Africa 2 October 1995.
39 World Bank “Country Assistance Strategy: South Africa” Washington DC Annex C 1999 p. 5.
40 Muller M “Turning on the taps” Mail&Guardian, 24 June 2004. 
41 Muller 2007 (fn 34 above) 41.
42 Miller 2007 (fn 34 above) 40; McDonald D, Pape J Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery in 
South Africa Pretoria: HSRC and London: Zed Books (2002).
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post-apartheid water delivery, no one knows exactly how many millions would 
reasonably be subtracted from those who Muller counts as newly connected, 
for one of the signal failings of DWAF during the post-apartheid era was the 
failure to embark upon systematic national monitoring and evaluation.
More details show how complicated the problem is. The most reliable sam-
ple studies of rural water connections are by David Hemson of the Human 
Sciences Research Council, who conducted research in KwaZulu-Natal prov-
ince commissioned by Kasrils. Using the minimalist definition of water access 
mandated in the RDP, according to Hemson, 57% of projects were either not 
working or problematic, because water provision was below required RDP 
levels.43 Hemson’s work is cited by Muller – but not these embarrassing statis-
tics.44 Moreover, the minimum RDP targets – 25 litres per capita per day (lcd) 
within 200 meters of a household – are short-term (years unspecified). Using 
the medium-term objective of 50-60 litres per person per day on site, which 
would be a logical objective after a decade and more of democracy, fewer than 
5% of the projects are probably working to RDP levels. One crucial problem 
is that the rural water projects were constructed not with these medium-term 
targets in mind, but with an assumption of permanent supplies of just 25 lcd 
and relatively stable (not expanding) community populations, resulting in 
much smaller pipes, lower borehole extraction capacity and a collective water 
well rather than household connections. These restrictions led to systematic 
system breakage when residents expected even minimal improvements, and 
thus broke new pipes or hoses into the water mains.
The national policy favouring disconnections is consistent with the water 
denial problems faced by Phiri residents, i.e., the neoliberal state’s orientation 
to provision of only the amounts of water that are affordable for consumption 
without subsidy.45 The point, however, is that as municipal protests became 
more regular during the 2000s and as self-reconnections occurred by com-
munity-oriented plumbers and electricians, the disconnection practice of 
municipalities such as Johannesburg shifted from explicit cut-offs (with all 
the political heat that would generate) towards, instead, a far more sophisti-
cated strategy: consumer self-disconnections, via the pre-paid meter.
6 BLAMING MUNICIPAL MISMANAGEMENT
Instead of addressing the self-destruction of DWAF water projects, it is far 
easier to blame consumers for nonpayment, and municipalities for not cop-
ing properly with the ‘unfunded mandate’ burden. That burden is the national 
expectation that even without sufficient resource transfers, local government 
could still take on further functions after 2001, including peri-urban and rural 
43 Hemson D “Rural Poor Play a Role in Water Projects”, Business Day, 1 July 2003. 
44 Muller (fn 34 above) 40, cites Hemson “The Sustainability of Community Water Projects in Kwa-
Zulu–Natal” Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council (2003).
45 Even the FBW allotment costs less to give away free to low-income households, as Durban shows, 
than to bill them, given the high administrative costs, and assuming that after 6000 liters per month, 
they pay the full amount including the first 6000 liters.
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water once provided by DWAF. Muller’s blame-shifting for national govern-
ment’s policy and financial shortfalls diverts our attention to municipal flaws:
“The emergence of a relatively autonomous form of local government from the pre-1994 
political negotiations reflected the residual hopes of minority parties that they could maintain 
a degree of separate administration. The acceptance of this autonomy by the majority par-
ties reflected, in turn, their democratic inclinations and belief in the importance of popular 
participation in governance processes, a demonstration of the power of the principle of 
decentralisation… Given this background, the politics of water services in South Africa has 
inevitably been dominated by the politics of local government.”46
In fact, the ‘elite transition’ that South Africa’s population suffered included 
enforced municipal-scale elite pacting under conditions of national elite 
mistrust, for the simple reason that between verkrampte Conservative Party 
dominance of many old white local authorities and militant SA National Civic 
Organisation demands and activism, there were practically no local-level peace 
deals between white and black struck in the 1990-94 period, with one excep-
tion, Stutterheim, but under very dubious circumstances.47 National negotiators 
knew that because urban social movements were a potential ongoing source of 
radical politics and potential ungovernability, municipal transitions would have 
to be sharply circumscribed. Hence as the transition unfolded, the interim Con-
stitution and Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) included concessions 
by the ANC negotiators (demanded by FW de Klerk’s team, especially Tertius 
Delport) that forced white and black municipal leaders into governments of 
local unity, no matter how distasteful. The techniques included a decisive bias 
in voting weight given to white-dominated wards, which received an automatic 
30 percent of council seats during the crucial 1995-99 period, plus veto power 
over budgets and zoning decisions with an additional three percent.48
Why is this important? Those compromise techniques prevented demo-
cratic mechanisms from operating, that otherwise might have decisively rid 
municipalities like Johannesburg of apartheid officials, laws, mentalities and 
systems, including those related to water.49 It is revealing that for Muller, 
on the one hand, “The emergence of a relatively autonomous form of local 
government from the pre-1994 political negotiations reflected the residual 
hopes of minority parties that they could maintain a degree of separate 
administration.” This is a correct interpretation of the white minority side of 
the elite pact. On the other hand, turning to the black majority side of the elite 
deal-making in the next sentence, Muller has a different – rather debatable 
– interpretation: “The acceptance of this autonomy by the majority parties 
reflected, in turn, their democratic inclinations and belief in the importance of 
popular participation in governance processes, a demonstration of the power 
of the principle of decentralisation.”50
46 Muller (fn 34 above) 36.
47 Bond (fn 12 above) 2000.
48 Ibid.
49 Even the name Johannesburg might have been changed to something appropriate – it is the first 
name of the surveyor of the stolen land, Johannes Rissik, but was maintained for “global branding” 
purposes.
50 Muller (fn 34 above) 36.
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Popular participation was in reality demobilised.51 There were far more conti-
nuities than change in the prevailing municipal power relations, as a result, and 
officially-inscribed municipal class apartheid emerged from the slow evolution of 
local democracy, as witnessed in differential municipal water services. Even the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government’s 1998 White Paper admitted 
that, as a result of such concessions, “Real transformation has yet to occur…. The 
compromises reached during the negotiation of the LGTA, such as the delimita-
tion of wards in a manner which skewed representation and the requirement 
that municipal budgets must be approved by a two-thirds majority, will remain 
in force until the final phase of the transition.”52 By the time of the final phase, 
starting in 2001, the processes of services commodification were cemented, and, 
as witnessed in Johannesburg, white, upper-class residents could count on non-
redistributive systems for water, electricity and other municipal goods. Even the 
working location of municipal employees – far more workers per capita service 
lower-density, formerly-white suburbs than townships – reflected the durability 
of privilege. But in all of this, water provided from the parish pump were, in 
effect, predetermined in location, quantity, quality and price by the national 
deal-making. And that deal-making hinged upon the application of neoliberal 
principles, of which none is more important than correlating consumer prices to 
costs, and in the process avoiding cross-subsidisation.
7 PRICING TO MARKET
Having argued that the easy blaming of municipal victims is not the appropri-
ate way to understand or to rectify South Africa’s water problems, we can 
now turn to the class bias – a bias tolerated in national policy – that perme-
ates the provision of water at municipal level, in large part because of the 
elite deal-making character of the transition. As even Muller himself con-
cedes, municipal water financing often is typically arranged so as “to avoid 
tariff increases for the well-to-do”.53 This is strikingly clear in Durban, the 
city that originated FBW but that, at the same time, doubled the average 
price of water (even adjusting for inflation) to its residents over a seven year 
period, 1997-2004. In Durban, the 1997 level of water consumption by the 
one third of the city’s metered (and regular bill-paying) residents who have the 
lowest income was 22 kl/household/month. Shortly afterwards, the first FBW 
strategy was adopted (for just the first 6 kl/household/month) in Durban, but 
steep increases in price for the next blocks of water were imposed. According 
to detailed research by Reg Bailey (a leading city official at the time), price 
increases resulted in average consumption by low-income consumers dimin-
ishing to 15 kl/household/month by 2003. 54
51 Bond (fn 11 above) 2005.
52 Department of Provincial and Local Government: “Local Government White Paper” Pretoria (1998).
53 Muller (fn 34 above) 36.
54 Bailey R, Buckley C “Modelling Domestic Water Tariffs”, Presentation to the University of KwaZulu-
Natal Centre for Civil Society’ Durban 7 November 2005. The price elasticity for water was, hence, 
a disturbing -0.55 – an extremely large impact for what should be a basic need, hence relatively 
impervious to price change. In contrast, for middle- and high-income consumers, the price rise was 
higher, but the corresponding decline in average consumption far less.
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One argument that logically follows from this example is that municipalities 
matter, therefore, Muller is correct that local politics dominate water provision. 
Yet the opposite is more true: the Durban case informed the national in disturbing 
ways. In motivating a free supply of (just) 25 litres per person each day, Kasrils 
couched his justification thus: “It would save money because local authori-
ties would not be saddled with the problem of administering large numbers 
of small accounts”.55 Durban was the preferred case study of implementing 
FBW: not to meet human rights, but rather to save money. In the process, it was 
implicitly accepted that at 6001 liters of consumption, the first 6000 liters would 
suddenly also be charged for (not just the additional one liter), so as to now 
justify sending out the bills to the “large number of small accounts”.56
In the process, instead of more aggressively cross-subsidising from wealthy 
households which consumed more water per capita, Johannesburg and other 
municipalities adopted the pre-paid meter, VIPs, shallow sanitation and related 
techniques – with national consent – so as to disincentivise further use of water 
by low-income people. As Trengove remarked to the court: “Rich people are 
given the luxury of using water first and paying later… Discrimination between 
the rich mostly white residents on the one hand, and the poor mostly black resi-
dents on the other, is sheer discrimination on grounds of poverty and race.”57
The national reasons for these municipal water inequities can be found 
in the 1994 White Paper, in cost-recovery and pro-disconnection regula-
tions, and in the late 1990s defunding of old homeland municipalities which 
received national water grants. Yet Muller, like Mbeki, would rather blame 
municipal personnel for patronage politics:
“In new municipalities, the battle has been to control personnel and procurement deci-
sions. These political battles delayed or even paralysed development projects [because 
they]… could, and often did, mean people who could help particular interest groups to 
take control of public resources for private benefit… [or] less qualified or often completely 
unqualified candidates [gained municipal jobs]… Lack of capacity to take water projects 
through to implementation was still cited as a reason for the systemic failure of munici-
palities to spend their resources effectively.”58
The reality, however, is that Muller’s DWAF had vast powers that were not 
exercised: to regulate and to declare “water emergencies” where systemic dis-
connections or underinvestment occurred (according to the National Water 
Act of 1998). As Kasrils himself promised in his June 2003 budget speech 
to parliament, “I will name and shame municipalities that fail to implement 
Free Basic Water.” But he never did prior to becoming minister of intelligence 
55 Business Day, 11 February 2000. 
56 The same logic applies to the Pretoria suburbs where wealthy state officials live, as even Trevor 
Manuel conceded in discussing the Phiri case in the Mail&Guardian: “Wim Trengove spoke about 
an inequality of use between living like this [he gestures at his treed garden where hadedas call and 
a swimming pool laps gently in the morning breeze] and people who battle to find water to wash. But 
if you’ve got four or five families living in the backyard, water will run out in the first week.” Manuel 
T “Not in my father’s house: Polokwane Briefing”, Mail&Guardian, 13 December 2007.
57 Sapa ‘Residents “were bullied into accepting prepaid meters” 3 December 2007.
58 Muller (fn 34 above) 37. 
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in 2004, where ironically, one of his tasks was to investigate the upsurge of 
municipal service delivery protests.59
8 SANITATION WITHOUT WATER
To illustrate government’s desire to limit water consumption by poor people, 
a vast project could have been launched to improve sanitation, but instead 
practically nothing was achieved in the new government’s first five years. 
DWAF used that period to extend low-volume water supplies in rural areas, 
with insufficient piping and supply to justify waterborne sanitation. There 
was no policy for a revamped urban sanitation system defined with national 
standards. For this reason, low-quality sanitation strategies were adopted 
within municipalities like Johannesburg.
Suez began installing a new ‘shallow sewage’ system as well as 6,500 pit 
latrines between 2003-05. Shallow sewage systems are attractive to the com-
pany, because maintenance costs are transferred to so-called ‘condominium’ 
residential users, where a very small water flush and slight gravity mean 
that the pipes must be manually unclogged every three months (or more 
frequently) by the residents themselves.60 But eco-blowback would inevita-
bly result from this kind of urban and peri-urban penny-pinching, as Kasrils 
admitted to parliament in 2001: “Unacceptable sanitation services resulting 
in severe water pollution, especially bacteriological pollution, is a grave con-
cern in Gauteng… A lack of funds has been identified as the hindering factor 
in the upgrading and maintenance of sewerage networks”.61
These problems would worsen dramatically in subsequent years, leading by 
early 2008 to national concerns of a water/sanitation crisis borne of the same 
maintenance shortfalls that led to widespread electricity load-shedding. Muller 
recognises the sanitation crisis, acknowledging that “the expansion of services 
to the unserved is slowing” because “The weak conditionality in the Division 
of Revenue Act (National Treasury, 2006), which regulates the municipal trans-
fers, now has clear incentives for municipalities not to extend services to the 
unserved.”62 Again, a national strategy would have solved this problem at the 
outset, by penalising municipalities which did not have sanitation plans for all 
residents, in terms of the National Water Act’s emergency provisions. 
59 www.dwaf.gov.za/Communications/PressReleases/2003/BUDGET%20Press%20Release%20version
%203.doc, accessed 23 February 2008.
60 In this case, Suez tells customers to: “Wear gloves; remove all solids and waste from the inspection 
chambers; do a mirror test for each chamber-to-chamber section; if waste material is found in a section, 
bring in the tube from the upstream inspection chamber until it comes into contact with the obstruc-
tion; block off the outlet from the downstream inspection chamber with a screen that allows water to 
pass through but not solids; push the tube until the material is moved to the downstream inspection 
chamber; wear gloves and remove waste material by hand; pour a large quantity of water through the 
section between the two inspection chambers and check for cleaning; repeat the mirror test; close the 
inspection chambers”. For more, see Harvey E “A critical analysis of the decision to corporatize the 
water and wastewater services in the City of Johannesburg”, Masters Dissertation, University of the 
Witwatersrand Graduate School of Public and Development Management, Johannesburg (2003).
61 The Star, 14 May 2001.
62 Muller (fn 34 above) 39. 
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9 A TRICKLE OF FREE BASIC WATER
The power of the national state in such circumstances is evident when we con-
sider FBW. According to Muller, “One way to ensure that public funds achieve 
their intended purpose after fiscal decentralisation is through policy”. An exam-
ple of this has been the introduction of a policy of “free basic water” (FBW), 
in the terms of which every household should receive 6,000 litres of water per 
month free. Any use above this should be paid for. Muller then notes that this 
policy cuts against the grain of the commodification strategy associated with 
globalisation and privatisation: “Conventional wisdom amongst international 
donors had been that all water consumption should be paid for.”63
Yet the way FBW was implemented contradicted the spirit of a rights-based 
approach. In telling this story – also a subject of much dispute in the Phiri 
court case – Muller distorts history:
“The ‘free basic water’ policy was a fundamental shift from the 1994 policy of the African 
National Congress (ANC) government. The ANC’s Reconstruction and Development 
Programme had avoided promising the ‘pie in the sky’. Its approach to water services was 
conservative, warning that all would have to pay something, talking of ‘a lifeline tariff to 
ensure that all South Africans are able to afford water services sufficient for health and 
hygiene requirements’ and ‘in rural areas, a tariff that covers operating and maintenance 
costs of services”.64
In reality, matters were much more complex. In early 1994 a vigorous debate 
was held (involving Bond, who was one of the RDP Final Editorial Commit-
tee members, representing the SA National Civic Organisation) about how to 
phrase the water promise. Muller, based at the neoliberal Development Bank of 
Southern Africa, led a small but powerful clique of rural water technical service 
providers. His insistence on full cost recovery of marginal costs in rural areas is 
reflected in the phrasing above; in contrast, the urban civic movement’s demand 
for cross-subsidisation and a “lifeline” supply reflected the assumption that free 
water should be provided. Tellingly, Muller does not recount this component of 
the RDP mandate (2.10.6.2): “in urban areas, a progressive block tariff to ensure 
that the long-term costs of supplying large-volume users are met and that there is 
a cross-subsidy to promote affordability for the poor” (emphasis added). Nor does 
he recall the RDP’s insistence (2.6.7) that the water subsidy for all South Africans 
should cover “an on-site supply of 50-60 litres per capita per day of clean water” 
in the “medium-term”, which is, at minimum, the length of time that any water/
sanitation infrastructure (capital investments) should cover.
The debate continued in the new government, when Asmal replied to a 
demand that he respect the RDP promise of a 50 litre per day lifeline supply 
of water as follows:
“The positions I put forward are not positions of a sell-out, but of positions that uphold 
the policy of the South African government and the ANC … The RDP makes no reference 
to free water to the citizens of South Africa. The provision of such free water has financial 
implications for local government that I as a national minister must be extremely careful 
enforcing on local government.”65
63 Ibid.
64 Miller (fn 34 above) 40. 
65 Asmal K “Policy Directions of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry” Letter to Patrick Bond 
Pretoria 8 May 1998 1. 
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It took a leap of logic to redefine the word “lifeline” to mean, not free, but instead 
the equivalent of the operating and maintenance costs, in other words, full mar-
ginal-cost recovery, namely the break-even cost of supplying an additional unit 
of the water to the customer. Muller argues that matters changed only in 2000 
because Free basic services were part of the government’s response to debates 
about social welfare policy. Anxious to avoid the cost and the creation of a 
culture of dependency, the ANC opted to promote the “social wage” concept, 
which included free basic water. This is myth-making, for in early 2000, not only 
did Kasrils announce free water on grounds that “It would save money because 
local authorities would not be saddled with the problem of administering large 
numbers of small accounts”, as noted above. There were also a variety of other 
crucial factors that converged to give content to water rights talk:
• growing alienation and apathy in townships, along with declining activity in 
ANC branches, leading to fears that substantial voter abstention would lower 
the ruling party’s overall vote and cost it control in key municipalities;
• the massive outbreak of cholera, which attracted international attention 
and undermined popular faith in the water system (even in the cities, 
where fears of contagion soon emerged);
• Mbeki’s bizarre public allegation, at the time of the July 2000 International 
Aids Conference in Durban, that “HIV doesn’t cause Aids, poverty causes 
Aids”, which required a rapid, face-saving backtrack, i.e., addressing pov-
erty by giving away a few drops of free water;
• the imminent October 2000 Grootboom decision in the Constitutional 
Court,66 which signalled that the Constitutional Court might finally 
enforce the socio-economic rights’ provisions in the Constitution (Irene 
Grootboom and her community in Wallacedene, in the Western Cape, 
won insofar as the City of Cape Town’s housing plan was declared uncon-
stitutional for failing to provide emergency shelter and services for the 
poorest and most vulnerable members of society); and finally,
• a dawning realisation that the neoliberal water pricing policy was caus-
ing more costs than benefits for the society as a whole, and certainly for 
DWAF’s reputation.
The point, again, is that because national policy (determined in large part by 
Muller) failed so decisively to deliver this crucial rights-based mandate, the Phiri 
residents now find themselves in court to have their legitimate demands met.
10  CONCLUSION: THREAT OF – OR HOPE FOR – 
POPULISTS AT THE PARISH PUMP?
South Africa’s poor people suffer a kind of water apartheid, and to end it requires 
more than the strategies that have to date been adopted by the post-apartheid 
state. The core argument by Thabo Mbeki, Mike Muller and other status quo com-
mentators is that existing neoliberal policies are fine, but local implementation is 
to blame for delivery crisis. Of course, as we have seen in the Johannesburg case, 
66 Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2001 (2) SA 46 (CC).
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local parish politics can indeed be held responsible for widespread South African 
water failures, particularly insofar as municipal power relations often reflect the 
way power is established and exercised at national scale.
But as the Phiri residents are attempting to prove in their municipally-spe-
cific but nationally-relevant case, overcoming local demand-side management 
techniques such as pre-paid meters, not to mention shallow sanitation, Ven-
tilated Improved Pit-Latrines and other discriminatory technologies which 
deny low-income people water, and an exceedingly small municipal FBW 
supply require systematic national policy change. Pre-paid meters should be 
nationally outlawed as a health hazard, as they are in Britain. A much larger 
FBW supply – at least 50 liters per person per day – is required. On offer 
from Johannesburg, a few weeks before the case was heard, was only one 
concession: a means-tested shift from 6 kl/hh/month to 10 kl/hh/month on 
condition of proof of indigency. Yet much of the benefit of this concession 
was soon under threat. Over the Easter weekend at the end of March 2008, 
the print media announced that the City of Johannesburg plans to revise its 
FBW policy.67 In terms of these proposals,68 the City plans to withdraw FBW 
allocations (and also Free Basic Electricity allocations) from all households 
except those on the indigency register.69 If implemented, these proposals will 
entrench conditions of socio-economic depravation in poor communities, 
and particularly in the poorest and most vulnerable households, which will 
struggle to successfully register for benefits. Nor do the proposals reflect a 
substantive shift away from a cost-recovery driven water delivery paradigm. 
67 The Star “Joburg water, power shock” 24 March 2008.
68 The City’s proposals were open to public comment for the month of April 2008: www.joburg.org.za. 
If adopted, the proposals are scheduled to come into effect on 1 July 2008.
69 There are fundamental problems with tying a socio-economic benefit to a means-tested register such 
as the City’s indigency register. First, this approach stigmatizes the poor, reducing them to second-
class citizens who do not fit into the normal contractual model. Second, Johannesburg’s indigency 
register is not well publicized (for example, it does not even appear on the City’s official website 
and, to date, the register has not been widely publicized across poor communities), so most poor 
households are not aware of it. Third, according to the current policy, acceptance onto the register is 
means-tested, requiring the applicant to provide proof of: being an account-holder (meaning that it 
is aimed at property-owners rather than tenants, who on the whole do not hold municipal accounts); 
having a combined monthly household income of less than twice the maximum government grant 
plus R1 (currently R940 × 2 = R1880 + R1 = R1881); as well as furnishing positive formal identi-
fication, proof of earnings and tax status. Fourth, and most importantly from a poverty-targeting 
perspective (and related to the above reasons), Johannesburg’s indigency register is hopelessly 
under-representative of the actual number of poor households, meaning that any benefit linked 
exclusively to the register will only reach a fraction of the formally qualifying poor households. The 
extent of the under-representation of Johannesburg’s poor on the current register was acknowledged 
in the answering affidavit of Rashid Seedat, Director of the Central Strategy Unit within the Office 
of the Executive Mayor of Johannesburg. (22 January 2007), Mazibuko & Others v City of Johan-
nesburg & Others: www.law.wits.ac.za/cals. At paragraph 31.4.2 of his affidavit, Seedat states that, 
as of 31 March 2006, the City’s indigency register reflected 118 000 indigent households. However, 
according to information extrapolated from Statistics South Africa’s 2001 Census (www.statssa.gov.
za/census01/html/default.asp), as well as the City’s Human Development Strategy of 2005 (www.
joburg.org.za/content/view/744/114/), there are an estimated 500 000 households in Johannesburg 
that earn between R0 and R1 600 per month (meaning that they formally qualify as indigent). This 
means that, a decade after its establishment (the indigency register was started in 1998), the City’s 
indigency register captures and administers benefits to only approximately a fifth of qualifying indi-
gent households. It is therefore a wholly inappropriate mechanism for poverty alleviation, especially 
if it is to become the City’s only or main mechanism to allocate benefits to the poor. 
26
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT
Indeed, the proposals are premised on the view that poor people are aberra-
tions to the normal contractual water supply paradigm, and should be forced 
to prove their poverty before they can receive any benefits.
Muller concludes his article by expressing concern about populists’ “effort 
to build international coalitions between green interests, progressive political 
movements, anti-poverty groups and rural activists. Unfortunately, the energy 
of these campaigns is not matched by the vigour and rigour with which they 
tackle the larger and more serious challenges of public organisation and sus-
tainability in the water sector.”70 Frightened as Muller might be about growing 
civil society alliances, the reader can be the judge about which social forces 
have the vigour, rigour, self-interest and civic commitment to improve the 
public sector’s performance. What the struggle between commodification and 
decommodification requires, it should be clear, is to connect the dots such 
that red (social justice) and green (conservation) objectives can be met at the 
same time and at both local and national parish pumps. Only then, together 
not apart, can both social and environmental justice be achieved.71
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